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<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/11/views-of-the-u-s/>

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The Washington Post, October 13, 2024

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- **'I don't really care what happens to Ukraine': what a JD Vance vice presidency could mean for the world**

The Conversation, July 2024

<https://theconversation.com/i-dont-really-care-what-happens-to-ukraine-what-a-jd-vance-vice-presidency-could-mean-for-the-world-234815>

- **More on J.D. Vance here:**

<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/17/jd-vance-reagan-gop-foreign-policy-00168862>

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- **Why the World Is Betting Against American Democracy**

Ambassadors to Washington warn that the GOP-Democratic divide is endangering America's national security.

Politico, Jan 2024

<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/01/15/what-foreign-diplomats-say-about-u-s-politics-behind-closed-doors-00135326>

- **Podcast from *The Economist*: How will the election change America's foreign policy?**

Our weekly podcast on democracy in America. This week, we assess how Donald Trump and Kamala Harris would handle international relations

<https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2024/09/06/how-will-the-election-change-americas-foreign-policy>

- **Radio Program with its scrip: The stakes of the U.S. election for the world**

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Guests

Michal Baranowski, managing director of the East division of The German Marshall Fund, a nonpartisan transatlantic think tank.

Denise Dresser, Mexican political analyst and columnist. She is a professor of political science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), where she has taught comparative politics, political economy, and Mexican politics since 1991.

Larry Madowo, international correspondent at CNN. Host of the CNN series African Voices Changemakers.

<https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2024/10/11/election-president-international-politics>

- https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/10/14/viktor-orban-l-europeen-qui-mise-sur-donald-trump_6351544_3232.html

- On soft power, by the "maestro" himself, Joseph Nye Jr:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q75uTqz5XS4&ab_channel=ForeignPolicyAssociation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58v19OtIIg&ab_channel=ForeignPolicyAssociation

On the question of America's global security role, the choice between presidential candidates has rarely been **starker** than in 2024.

5 Trump has been a transformative figure, the first president since the Second World War to denounce American global leadership, call for a renunciation of alliances, and demand a much narrower interpretation of US foreign interests. There is still a contest
10 **underway** in the Republican Party to see how far Trump's retrenchment efforts will go, but the direction of movement is clear.

That leaves the Democratic Party, now led by Vice President Harris, **as the last champion of American**
15 **foreign policy exceptionalism**, the final **redoubt** for those who believe that the United States has global interests which must, if necessary, be protected by a military force that is second to none. Former Republican Vice President Dick Cheney's recent
20 endorsement of Harris can be interpreted in this light.

In her address to the Democratic National Convention accepting the presidential nomination, Harris promised to "strengthen — not abdicate — our global leadership", and that America will always have
25 "the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world".

There is no question that Harris can maintain America's status as the leading military power in the world, but this ranking would be secure under Trump too, such is America's lead. It has by far the world's biggest military
30 budget, the biggest navy by tonnage, and the biggest air force by aircraft. It boasts an unequalled technological base to develop new weapons. For more than two years, the United States has led international efforts to support Ukraine, frustrating Putin's ambitions while spending
35 just 0.16 per cent of its GDP.

But Russia is a comparatively weak **foe**. Whether Harris is judged to have **upheld** the tradition of global military activism supported by Cheney and embodied in Joe Biden's claim that "American leadership is what holds
40 the world together" will not be decided on the battlefields of Ukraine. It will be judged by the extent to which the United States tries to reverse its eroding military advantage over China.

China is a much harder challenge than Russia because
45 Beijing has so many more resources at its disposal, most importantly a massive economy that has **devoted** an estimated US\$474 billion to its military in 2024, or a bit more than one-third of the Pentagon's budget. For that

comparatively modest outlay, China has built a modern
50 and capable air and maritime force that can threaten the United States and its allies close to China's shores. It cannot compete with the United States in ship tonnage or aircraft numbers, but it doesn't have to, because China doesn't (yet) have global military ambitions.
55 Even so, China now threatens America's lead in critical respects. It is quadrupling the size of its nuclear arsenal, and its navy already has more ships than the US Navy. A new report by India's Observer Research Foundation finds that China's nuclear-powered submarine program
60 has finally matured, too. If, as the report projects, the new Bohai shipyard can indeed produce three to four nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) per year, that translates to a fleet of 30 to 40 in a decade. By this same point in time, Australia is expected to have
65 inducted perhaps two Virginia-class SSNs under **the AUKUS arrangement**, while the US Navy will likely have 50 to 60 SSNs.

These are long-term projections, yet decisions made by the Harris administration will determine if they meet
70 reality. A Harris administration can decide to invest in the US military-industrial base so that the United States can match Chinese shipbuilding rates, and it can boost defence spending to correct the tilt away from US dominance in Asia. A Harris administration can elect to
75 leave European security to the Europeans so that the United States can concentrate its forces in Asia.

But as with so many aspects of Harris' worldview, the little information we have about her preferences suggests her presidency will produce continuity rather
80 than change. We should expect more initiatives like those the Biden team initiated in Asia, such as AUKUS, expanded US basing in the Philippines, and a strengthened nuclear **deterrent** agreement with South Korea. But we should not expect dramatic new military
85 investments or a major rebalancing of forces to Asia, since none of her post-Cold War predecessors have done this either.

Under a Harris administration, then, the Asian military balance will continue to shift away from the United
90 States and towards China. As with so many of her predecessors, Harris would maintain rhetorical **fealty** with America's tradition of muscular internationalism, but also like them, she would find it impossible to pay the increasingly steep price required to enact it.

95 Published by the Lowy Institute, October 4, 2024

By Jeffrey A. Engel

Los Angeles Times, Oct. 11, 2024 3 AM PT

Words matter. Especially when uttered by a president, and especially overseas. “Speak softly, and carry a big stick,” Theodore Roosevelt advised, though he never envisioned a successor would prove capable of obliterating cities half a world away in under half an hour. That nuclear stick is pretty big indeed, capable since 1945 of keeping our most virulent adversaries, including Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang, from their most reckless ambitions. It also keeps allies in line. What do Japan, Saudi Arabia, Germany and South Korea have in common? Each is but a day away from joining the nuclear club. That day is when their leaders stop believing the president of the United States will come to their aid.

This is why I fear a second Trump term. A world increasingly riven by renewed great power rivalries and historic animosities is further weakened by Oval Office instability, exemplified by ill-advised remarks, ill-timed threats and outright lies. Calm captains of the ship of state struggle to navigate the world system’s waves and shoals. An erratic one won’t help. Especially one whose obsessions, personal grievances and loose relationship with the truth make others question not only America’s policy but more fundamentally our reliability. (...)

Examples abound of even experienced leaders forgetting their rhetorical reach.

Dwight Eisenhower’s 1956 promise of aid inspired Hungarians to revolt against Soviet control, leading most to their death or to exile. Ike never thought they’d take him so literally. He meant moral and rhetorical aid, the thoughts and prayers kind. Hungary’s freedom fighters expected guns, or better yet American troops that Eisenhower never meant to imply would be forthcoming. Desperate people heard what they wanted to hear when the man in the Oval Office was unclear.

Words mattered at the end of the Cold War, too. Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” against his own State Department’s guidance, which also tried to stop him from saying “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall,” lest such a direct challenge rile the Kremlin. But that was precisely Reagan’s point. Another word for “rile” is “catalyze,” which is what Reagan hoped to do to the rumblings of change behind the Iron Curtain.

George H.W. Bush also understood the power of presidential proclamations and was thus largely mute when the Berlin Wall finally fell in 1989. “I guess I’m just not an excitable guy,” he told CBS reporter Leslie Stahl and a similarly bewildered White House press corps amazed by his laconic response. But Bush knew presidential triumphalism at that precarious moment might spark a hard-line backlash. “I’m not going to dance on the wall,” he said privately, forgoing personal political gain to preserve America’s Cold War triumph.

Presidents are supposed to care more about the nation’s fate than their own. Barack Obama’s reputation suffered when he refused to back up his own “red line” against Syrian use of chemical weapons in 2013, but he ultimately reasoned his promise to avoid another Middle East quagmire mattered more than his own temporary loss of prestige. Joe Biden’s decision to keep his promise to end America’s generation-long fight in Afghanistan showed consistency even when retaliation for losses endured during the evacuation might have helped him in the polls. Better to demonstrate prudence, he reasoned, than to rashly reverse a well-considered decision in hope of temporarily saving face.

This is why the prospect of a second Trump presidency is so terrifying: His unconsidered words reverberate. He was the first president since Harry Truman, which is to say the only president ever, to cast doubt on our commitment to defend our NATO allies. “Does that mean that you won’t protect us in case — if we don’t pay, you won’t protect us from Russia,” Trump boasted a foreign leader lamenting. “I said, ‘That’s exactly what it means.’”

Perhaps this was more bluster than extortion, a negotiating tactic to encourage tight-fisted allies to boost their defense spending. Either way, the story has become part of Trump’s standard rally repertoire. Our allies, meanwhile, inch closer to creating their own security guarantees every time Trump puts another dent in the armor of collective security. Including their own nuclear deterrent.

Treaties and promises are, ultimately, mere scraps of paper. They only matter if leaders are trusted to follow through. After a decade of undermining Washington’s commitment to NATO, including four years as president, Trump has no reservoir of reliability among our partners, at least those that remain beyond the grip of their own strongmen. (...)

Trump’s prevarications underline his unreliability. He will say anything that leaps to mind, or anything he thinks will help him win, no matter the veracity or collateral damage. A presidential candidate willing to lie about immigrants, FEMA, military chiefs or a hurricane’s expected path can’t be trusted to tell the truth about future crises. Worse still is his tendency to double down rather than admitting error. (...)

Trump's falsehoods are unmatched in presidential history. Franklin Roosevelt promised that Americans would build 50,000 aircraft a year to combat Nazi aggression. Asked by aides where he got that big, round number, Roosevelt responded he'd made it up, noting that defeating fascism required Americans to think in larger terms than ever before. Abraham Lincoln fibbed as well, telling newspaper readers in 1862 that he was not considering emancipating the Confederacy's enslaved people when he'd already decided to do so. Even the greats sometimes lie, albeit for national rather than personal gain. Trump lies for himself.

Donald Trump shuns what Ike learned, Reagan deployed, Bush restrained and Obama realized: The big stick of American power requires speaking not so much softly as reliably.

FDR and Lincoln knew when they were lying. Does Trump? The world should fear another four years of wondering if he can tell the difference.

Jeffrey A. Engel is the founding director of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University. He is at work on his 15th book, "Seeking Monsters to Destroy: How Americans Go to War from George Washington to Today."

Document 3 - US Foreign Policy in 2025

Sep 5, 2024, [Joseph S. Nye, Jr.](#)

While much is at stake in this year's US presidential election, there will be large areas of continuity in US foreign policy no matter who wins. But the differences between the candidates' attitudes toward alliances and multilateralism are significant – and that could make all the difference.

CAMBRIDGE – As the US presidential election draws near, many are wondering what it will mean for American foreign policy. The answer is wrapped in uncertainty.

As wealth inequality in the United States has grown, so has the social status and influence of the superrich, many of whom parlay their economic success into an intellectual credential. Clearly, Americans need to have a serious conversation about what they, as a society, should value.

First, who will win the election? At the beginning of the summer, polls showed Donald Trump well ahead of President Joe Biden. But now that Vice President Kamala Harris has become the Democratic Party candidate, polls show her with a slight lead. The problem, of course, is that if voter sentiments can swing so quickly, predicting where they will lie on November 5 is all but impossible. While Harris has demonstrated impressive political skill, democratic politics is full of surprises.

Second, foreign leaders and actors also have a "vote," in the sense that their behavior can suddenly change the US agenda and the probabilities of various outcomes. The modest foreign policy that George W. Bush outlined during his 2000 campaign was nothing like the policy that he pursued after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Who knows what kind of surprise Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping might have in store.

Campaign statements do provide some hints about policy, of course. If Harris wins, one can expect a continuation of Biden's policy, albeit with some adjustments. She seems to place less emphasis on promoting democracy – one of Biden's biggest themes – and she says a bit more about Palestinian rights. Generally, though, she would pursue the same policy of reinforcing US alliances and promoting multilateralism.

Trump is more unpredictable. While all politicians stretch the truth, he is notorious in this regard. It is difficult to know which statements might become policy. His rhetoric about unilateralism and downgrading alliances and multilateral institutions tells us something about the tenor of his foreign policy, but it does not answer questions about specific issues.

Observers often try to improve their predictions by looking at the candidates' advisers. Harris's top foreign-policy hand is Philip Gordon, a pragmatic, highly respected centrist who handled European and the Middle Eastern affairs in prior Democratic administrations before becoming the vice president's chief foreign-policy adviser.

By contrast, it is difficult to identify a comparable figure in the Trump camp – though the press sometimes mentions Robert O'Brien, Trump's last national-security adviser. What we do know is that Trump regrets having appointed traditional Republicans to key roles during his previous term, since they duly curtailed his freedom of action and made his policies more moderate than he wished.

It is also worth noting some similarities between the two candidates. Most important are their positions on China. There is now a broad bipartisan consensus that China has not played fair on trade and intellectual-property issues, and

that its assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas is threatening American allies like Japan and the Philippines. China has said many times that it would not rule out the use of force in seizing Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province. In many ways, Biden continued Trump's China policy, and Harris would likely do the same, with some adjustments.

A second similarity between the candidates is their rejection of neoliberal economic policies. During Trump's presidency, the US abandoned the traditional (Reagan-era) Republican approach to trade, increased tariffs, and downgraded participation in the World Trade Organization. This was all done under the guidance of US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, who remains influential in Trump's circle.

Trump also spurned the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Barack Obama had negotiated, and Biden then did nothing to rejoin that agreement or to remove Trump's tariffs on imports from China. In fact, Biden went further by introducing new technology-focused export controls against China (billed as erecting a "high fence around a small yard"). With her own ties to the US tech industry as a Californian, Harris is unlikely to lower the fence. And Trump, if anything, will expand the yard.

Moreover, both Trump and Harris have pledged to increase American hard power – militarily and economically – through investments in the defense budget and the defense industrial base. Both also can be expected to continue the current nuclear-weapons modernization program, and to promote the development of new weapons that use artificial intelligence.

One of the biggest differences concerns the candidates' positions on Europe. Trump and his running mate, J.D. Vance, have made it clear that they have little interest in supporting Ukraine and NATO. Trump claims that he would end the war quickly through negotiations, and it is difficult to see how this could be done without weakening Ukraine dramatically.

In the Middle East, both candidates have pledged to maintain Israel's security and its right to self-defense, though Harris also speaks of a Palestinian right to self-determination. Both probably would urge Saudi Arabia to proceed with normalizing relations with Israel, and both would take a tough line on Iran. But whereas Trump assigns low priorities to Africa and Latin America, Harris could be expected to pay more attention to those regions.

The most dramatic difference concerns American soft power: the ability to secure desired outcomes through persuasion rather than coercion or payment. During his presidency, Trump opted for an "America First" unilateralism that led other countries to conclude that their interests were not being considered. He also openly rejected multilateralism, most dramatically by withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization. Biden reversed those moves, but Trump would probably reverse the reversal, whereas Harris would maintain American participation. She also would be more likely than Trump to issue statements promoting human rights and democracy.

In short, there will be large areas of continuity in US foreign policy no matter who wins the election. But the differences between the candidates' attitudes toward alliances and multilateralism are significant – and that could make all the difference.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, is a former US assistant secretary of defense and the author of *Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump* (Oxford University Press, 2020) and *A Life in the American Century* (Polity Press, 2024).

Document 4 - Former US ambassador Jeffrey Hawkins: 'If Trump is re-elected, Europe will have to do without US security guarantees'

Op-Ed , Jeffrey Hawkins,

Le Monde in English, October 14, 2024

Jeffrey Hawkins believes that a Donald Trump victory on November 5 would cause Europe to lose significant market share to the United States and the EU will become isolated in its efforts to promote a more democratic world.

In the American foreign policy class I teach at Science Po Paris, I asked a Lithuanian student what the impact would be if a reelected Donald Trump decided to pull out of NATO. She looked me straight in the eyes and without hesitation, said, "The Russians will invade my country." There is no telling for sure at this point who the next American president will be. The polls are close, and closer still in the handful of "swing states" that will decide the presidential elections on November 5. There is a very real possibility that Trump could prevail in the coming electoral

10 contest. Regardless of whether or not he actually lets the Russians invade Lithuania, the impact of a second Trump presidency on Europe will be significant.

We have all certainly had a preview, of course. Trump was, after all, president for four years already. I would argue, though, that for a variety of reasons, the first administration was nothing more than a somewhat chaotic dress rehearsal for what may be to come. This time, however, his team will be far more focused and the policy results will be far more wide-reaching. So how will a Trump presidency change your world?

15 Read more [Subscribers only Pledging 'retribution,' Trump fuels fears for rule of law](#)

First, the United States will no longer guarantee European security. Trump has always been a NATO skeptic, and he has often questioned the value of the alliance. In a second Trump administration, we are likely to see the US make radical changes to its transatlantic security commitments. An outright withdrawal from NATO may not be in the cards, at least right away. But Trump will almost certainly change our force posture in NATO. The Center for Renewing America, a think tank with ties to Trump, argued last year for a "dormant NATO," a concept that has apparently gained currency in Republican policy circles.

20 **Criticism of free trade**

The "dormant NATO" idea would leave the American nuclear umbrella in place, as well as some American air and naval assets in the European theater. Otherwise, US troops would come out, and Europe would confront future military threats largely on its own. NATO is also a powerful diplomatic tool for generating Transatlantic consensus on response to shared threats. Coordinated cooperation amongst Western democracies on security issues will likely evaporate with Trump's election. Trump policy advisors have apparently advocated for a "two-tier" NATO system, where the US only guarantees the security of states that have "fully paid their fair share."

In the immediate term, Trump will almost certainly abandon allied support for Ukraine. Trump has said he'd resolve the conflict overnight, presumably by pressuring Ukraine to accept the demands of the Russian aggressor. His vice-presidential candidate, JD Vance, notably said in 2022, "I gotta be honest with you, I don't really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another."

Europe will lose market share in the US, and the jobs that go with it. The United States is the European Union's largest trading partner, larger than China if you count both goods and services, with two-way trade in goods in 2023 at around €849 billion. The European Commission estimates that this trade is directly responsible for some 9.4 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.

Trump has always been critical of free trade, and his campaign rhetoric has been nakedly protectionist. Trump has taken to calling himself "Tariff Man" and recently said that "tariffs are the greatest thing ever invented." Trump's industrial policy has particularly targeted China. But make no mistake, Europe will be a target as well.

40 **Contempt for democratic values**

Trump has called for an across-the-board tariff of up to 20% on all imported goods, which would effectively price many French and European goods out of the US market. Trump has also threatened US companies that do their manufacturing outside the US, urging them to bring their production home or pay the consequences. In 2019, some 4500 American companies in France employed nearly half a million French people.

45 American leadership will diminish, and a champion for the values the United States and Europe share will wane. For all its flaws and failings, though, the United States remains an immensely powerful nation committed to the same core values as Europe. Human rights, democracy, rule of law, these fundamental concepts are both European and American.

At home, a twice impeached, convicted felon Trump has evidenced little support for these values, most notably in his continued denial of the 2020 election results and his threats to prosecute his opponents if he is elected. Overseas, these are certainly not likely to be the focus on a foreign policy centered on quid-pro-quo and cozy relationships with autocratic rulers and far-right politicians. European voices committed to democratic norms and respect for human rights will carry much less far without a committed partner in the White House.

Jeffrey Hawkins, a former American diplomat, is a research associate at the Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques. He has notably served as US Ambassador to the Central African Republic and Consul General in Nigeria.

Le républicain, spécialiste des affaires étrangères, estime que l'Europe devrait « monter en gamme en matière d'autonomie et de capacités de défense ».

Par [Piotr Smolar](#) (Washington, correspondant)

5 Publié le 18 juillet 2024

Elbridge Colby, rencontré en marge de la convention républicaine à Milwaukee (Wisconsin), figure parmi les noms souvent cités pour mettre en musique la politique étrangère d'une éventuelle administration Trump. Ancien secrétaire
10 adjoint à la défense, chargé du développement des forces et de la stratégie (2017-2018), c'est un auteur prolifique, souvent sollicité par les médias conservateurs, focalisé sur la rivalité systémique avec la Chine.

Donald Trump conçoit les relations internationales sous un angle transactionnel, que ce soit avec l'OTAN ou Taïwan. A quoi devons-nous nous attendre, en cas d'administration Trump-Vance ?

Je ne parle pas au nom de Donald Trump ou de son équipe. Pour moi, « transactionnel » implique un échange tactique à court terme. Les mots utilisés sur la plate-forme du parti sont « bon sens ». Les intérêts américains d'abord. Si, par exemple, l'équilibre des responsabilités dans les relations entre alliés, avec l'Europe ou le Japon, n'a plus de sens pour les Américains et est inéquitable – ce qui est clairement le
20 cas –, il faut rectifier cela, plutôt que de l'ignorer. C'est la façon de préserver nos alliances. L'« ordre international fondé sur le droit » est une construction artificielle récente. Nous rejetons l'hubris et le manque de faisabilité de la stratégie post-guerre froide, et nous discutons d'un retour à
25 la stratégie républicaine de la guerre froide, qui a toujours eu le souci d'aligner les objectifs et les moyens.

Vous êtes l'un des plus ardents défenseurs d'un pivot vers l'Asie. Mais Donald Trump suggère que son administration abandonnerait Taïwan en cas d'invasion chinoise...

Les Taïwanais ne peuvent pas prendre pour acquis le fait que les Américains les soutiendraient. Je l'ai dit au président taïwanais : vous êtes sur la lame d'un couteau. Lorsque le président Trump dit que Taïwan serait difficile à défendre, il exprime une opinion partagée par de nombreux Américains,
35 y compris dans l'establishment républicain. Taïwan est à la soixante-dixième place sur cent dans les intérêts des Américains. Si sa défense devient trop chère et risquée, nous serons peut-être obligés de réduire nos pertes. Mais il vaudrait mieux éviter cela, en donnant à Trump la meilleure
40 base possible pour défendre Taïwan : l'expression de la force par la défense préventive.

On aurait dû conserver nos ressources depuis des années, comme l'a dit le sénateur J. D. Vance. Au lieu de cela, l'administration Biden a envoyé tout l'armement en Ukraine,
45 et l'argent en Ukraine, en Europe et au Moyen-Orient.

J. D. Vance est à présent le colistier de Donald Trump. Quel message ce choix envoie-t-il aux alliés américains, dans l'OTAN ?

Je ne parle pas en son nom, mais c'est un choix magnifique, pour une politique étrangère de bon sens au profit des Américains. Quoi qu'il se passe à Taïwan, les Etats-Unis vont se focaliser davantage sur l'Asie, et nos capacités ont des limites. La plate-forme républicaine ne prévoit pas un doublement du budget de la défense. Le résultat est clair
55 pour l'Europe. Elle doit monter en gamme en matière d'autonomie et de capacités de défense. Oui, les Européens progressent. Certains montrent la voie. Mais, au total, les Européens agissent trop lentement et de façon inadéquate. L'effort de 2 % n'est pas à la hauteur. La France, comme le
60 Royaume-Uni, conservent une infrastructure militaire. Le président Macron adore présenter une vue très ambitieuse de ce qu'il faut faire en Ukraine. Mais je me demande s'il est sérieux, quand on regarde ce que la France a vraiment donné à l'Ukraine.

Et pourquoi devrions-nous applaudir l'Allemagne pour son effort à 2 %, après sa démilitarisation pendant trente-cinq ans, lui permettant d'investir dans sa propre économie, pendant que l'Amérique dépensait 3,5 % ou plus ? Il y a un chemin, mais les alliés doivent être pragmatiques, assumer
70 leur part, et arrêter de se tordre les mains.

Les Européens craignent que la Russie n'attaque un pays de l'OTAN, si l'invasion de l'Ukraine demeure impunie. Que se passerait-il alors ?

Si ce que vous dites est vrai, pourquoi ne dépensez-vous pas plus pour votre défense ? Ce serait le signal le plus efficace, pour l'Amérique, du fait que vous êtes sérieux. Demandez aux gens à la convention. Nous ne voulons pas être le gendarme du monde. Cela ne signifie pas que nous sommes isolationnistes. C'est tendancieux de le dire. Mais nous
80 serons plus sélectifs et nous verrons si les gens sont sérieux. La voie à suivre, c'est celle où chacun fait sa part pour la défense collective.

Mais l'OTAN n'est pas qu'une affaire d'argent, elle engage aussi ses membres autour d'un principe de solidarité...

Au cœur de l'Alliance se trouve la force militaire. Nous devons nous préparer à un modèle différent au sein de l'OTAN, dans lequel le pilier européen est plus significatif et prend peut-être plus le manche dans l'Alliance. Pensez-vous que Charles de Gaulle voulait de l'essence gratuite ? Que Churchill et Adenauer envisageaient que les [Etats]
90 [e]uropéens deviendraient des dépendances incapables de déployer des forces sur le terrain ? Les Européens en sont parfaitement capables.

Comment une administration républicaine gérerait-elle la Chine, en dehors de la taxe de 10 % sur tous les produits importés que Donald Trump a annoncée ?

Nous devrions concentrer notre force militaire et notre capacité industrielle de défense sur notre rival essentiel, la Chine. Nous aurions alors à la fois un bouclier et une
105 ouverture pour un modus vivendi avec les Chinois. Je rejette les vues de ceux qui appellent à un changement de régime

ou qualifient le gouvernement chinois de maléfique. Je pense que nous devons parler doucement, mais avec un grand bâton. Nos forces ont un niveau de préparation au combat historiquement bas. Quelque 40 % de nos sous-marins d'attaque sont au chantier ou attendant des réparations. Tous les programmes navals sont retardés. C'est la pire politique.

L'administration Biden est attachée à l'idée d'une confrontation entre les démocraties libérales, aux valeurs partagées, et les régimes autoritaires...

Et alors, ça se passe comment ? Je ne pense pas que ce soit la bonne façon de voir le monde. Les Etats agissent dans leur propre intérêt. Ce genre de rhétorique tombe à plat, hors de l'Europe du Nord et de l'Ouest. Cela ne marche pas avec l'Inde, avec le Vietnam, avec de nombreux pays colonisés par les Européens... Je n'aime pas l'expression « axe du mal », mais si nous sommes dans une compétition existentielle

entre la démocratie et l'autocratie, pourquoi réduire le budget de défense en termes réels ? L'administration Biden se vante de toutes les rencontres officielles qu'elle organise. En fait, ils parlent comme John Fitzgerald Kennedy, et ils dépensent comme Bill Clinton.

Donald Trump a déclaré qu'il arrêterait la guerre en Ukraine en vingt-quatre heures, pendant la période de transition. Quelle est la formule magique ?

Je ne sais pas, mais il est habituel de ne pas révéler son plan. Eisenhower en 1952 était candidat en promettant d'aller en Corée. C'était son plan de paix. En 1968, Nixon a dit qu'il stopperait la guerre au Vietnam. En 1980, Reagan a dit qu'il résoudrait la crise des otages en Iran. Les candidats font campagne sur des plans de paix sans dévoiler les détails de leur stratégie. Je soutiens en tout cas l'effort pour faire la paix en Ukraine, et je ne pense pas que ce pays devrait être dans l'OTAN.

On Economic Power

Document 6 - America is sabotaging itself in the global battle for talent

The Economist, August 15, 2024 (abridged)

Who said the following? “You graduate from a college, I think you should get, automatically as part of your diploma, a green card [permanent residence in the United States].” The surprising answer is Donald Trump. Whether he meant it or not—and his record in office suggests not—his words suggest that even a nativist politician understands, at some level, that highly skilled foreigners can be useful.

In fact they are extra-useful, since their skills tend to complement those of locals. They bring different experiences, knowledge and contacts, making local co-workers more productive. A Harvard study tried to measure this by looking at what happened to researchers when a colleague died. The loss of an immigrant brainbox reduced co-workers' productivity (measured in patents) by nearly twice as much as the loss of a native. From this, the study estimated that immigrants in America, though only 14% of the population, are responsible for a colossal 36% of innovation. As the globalisation of capital stagnates, the flow of brains across borders becomes an ever-more important way for new ideas to spread.

Most rich countries are reluctant to let in many more labourers or asylum-seekers, but claim to be eager to attract top talent, especially in fields deemed strategic (such as AI) or of obvious benefit to voters (such as medicine). America, China and most European countries all profess to welcome such people. Monaco even has an “attractiveness secretary” to lure high-flying entrepreneurs.

Yet other priorities often intrude. [...] In Britain an obsession with cutting overall migration has led the Labour government to urge tech firms to hire fewer foreign engineers, on the false premise that this will create more high-tech jobs for natives. As for America, though it has the world's most attractive labour market, it has one of the world's most dysfunctional immigration systems.

When a company applies for an H-1B (temporary work visa) on behalf of a highly skilled worker with a six-figure job offer, there is a 75% chance it will be rejected. But not quickly. It can take a year of faffing: an eternity in the tech business. And if the over-achiever in question eventually wants permanent residence—so she can settle in, plan for the future and not worry about her children being deported when they turn 21 and are no longer deemed dependants—she had better not be from a populous country. Thanks to a ludicrous rule that no more than 7% of work-based green cards may go to any one country each year, Indian citizens can expect to wait 134 years for one.

Many give up and go elsewhere. Some 73% of foreign graduates of American universities tell pollsters they want to stay in America, but only 41% actually do so. The blockage in the pipeline from campus to job is one reason

why American universities, though the best in the world, have been losing market share to Australian and Canadian ones for two decades.

30 Contrast this with Dubai, where anyone with a salary above a certain threshold can get a work visa in a week. Settling in is easy—a fully digitised system lets you obtain a driving licence, open a bank account and so forth in a few days. Expats can sponsor nannies for work visas, so both halves of a power couple can work. This extraordinarily welcoming system has helped turn Dubai from an obscure port on the edge of the desert into a global business hub in barely a generation.

35 Democracies cannot simply copy autocratic Dubai. (...) Nonetheless, Dubai is a useful benchmark for how a government can make an immigration system nearly frictionless for the people it most wishes to attract. Its success is an implicit rebuke of places that still have paper forms and surly border officials, such as America. If they want to, democracies can quickly improve their immigration systems, as Portugal has, turning itself from a relative backwater into an oasis for digital nomads in a decade or so. [...]

Document 7 - America's extraordinary economy keeps defying the pessimists

The Economist | Mar 14th 2024

You have to marvel at America's economy. Not long ago it was widely thought to be on the brink of recession. Instead it ended 2023 nearly 3% larger than 12 months earlier, having enjoyed one of the boomier 5 years of the century so far. And it continues to defy expectations. At the start of this year, economists had been forecasting annualised growth in the first quarter of 1%; that prediction has since doubled. The labour market is in rude health, too. The unemployment rate 10 has been below 4% for 25 consecutive months, the longest such spell in over 50 years. No wonder Uncle Sam is putting the rest of the world to shame. Since the end of 2019 the economy has grown by nearly 8% in real terms, more than twice as fast as the euro zone's and 15 ten times as quickly as Japan's. Britain's has barely grown at all.

America's expansion is all the more striking when you consider the many things that could have killed it. As the Federal Reserve has fought inflation the 20 economy has endured the sharpest rise in interest rates since **Jimmy Carter** was in the White House. The covid-19 pandemic, an intensifying trade war with China and the fight against climate change have together reshaped supply chains, labour markets and 25 consumer preferences. Wars in Ukraine and Gaza have aggravated geopolitical tensions and worsened the strains on the global trading system.

Can America's remarkable strength persist? Threats to growth still hang over the economy. The longer 30 interest rates stay high, for instance, the more damage they could do. Although inflation has fallen, it remains sticky above the Fed's 2% target, meaning that the Fed may be unable to fulfil investors' hopes for interest-rate cuts starting in June. Geopolitical tensions, meanwhile, 35 look likely to spur economic fragmentation. Yet the

biggest threat of all **stems from** November's presidential election. Neither Joe Biden nor Donald Trump seems likely to **nurture** the economic expansion should they return to the White House. Instead, their 40 plans would endanger it.

To understand this, consider the reasons for the economy's extraordinary performance. A key plank was generous pandemic stimulus, which at 26% of GDP was more than double the rich-world average. 45 This largesse fuelled inflation but also ensured fast growth: consumers have yet to spend all the cash they received in "stimmy" cheques. Even as the covid crisis passed, the government continued to borrow away. The underlying deficit over the past year was nearly 8% 50 of GDP. That supported demand even as rates went up.

Strong demand has been met by growing supply. America has 4% more workers than it did at the end of 2019, thanks in part to rising workforce participation, but mainly owing to higher immigration. The foreign- 55 born population is up by 4.4m, a figure which may undercount those who arrived illegally. And the expanding workforce is being put to productive use. America's flexible labour market has almost certainly made it easier for the economy to adapt fast to a 60 changing world.

Other long-standing strengths have made America enviably placed to cope with geopolitical tumult. Its vast internal market encourages innovation and means it depends less on foreign trade than smaller rich 65 economies do. Because the shale boom of the 2010s made America a net energy exporter, it has in aggregate benefited rather than suffered from the high energy prices that hit the wallets of Europeans.

The trouble is that each of the ingredients for growth 70 can no longer be relied upon. It may be tempting for

politicians to extrapolate from America's recent success and juice the economy with further stimulus. But that is becoming unsustainable. Official forecasts show that America will this year spend more on debt interest than 75 national defence. More borrowing risks building up financial perils in the future.

At the same time, both Mr Trump and Mr Biden **harbour** populist and protectionist instincts that will only harm America's growth potential. The sugar- 80 rush of stimulus helped mask the damaging effects of such policies during each president's first term. This time, however, the damage will not be disguised.

Mr Trump poses the graver threat. He has entertained **a blanket** 10% tariff on imports, which some of his 85 advisers see as a mere starting-point. That would triple America's existing levies on goods imports, worsen inflation and raise the cost of imported parts for manufacturers. At the same time, Mr Trump has promised the mass deportation of illegal immigrants. 90 This goes well beyond trying to secure the border against new unauthorised entrants—a reasonable goal—and poses a risk to the labour supply: in 2021 America's 10.5m irregular migrants made up an estimated 5% of its workforce.

95 A Trump presidency would also threaten the Fed's independence. Mr Trump says he would not reappoint its chairman, Jerome Powell, whose term expires in 2026, and whom he often criticised when in office. A

pliant Fed at a time of big deficits—which Mr Trump 100 might increase with more tax cuts—could threaten America's macroeconomic stability.

A second Biden term promises nothing as potentially catastrophic. Mr Biden has let the Fed get on with fighting inflation, and wants to raise taxes to 105 reduce deficits. Yet he is also an economic nationalist. His State of the Union address on March 7th was **littered with** protectionist promises that the government would "Buy American", and statist ideas about controlling the price of everything from housing 110 to Snickers bars.

Both Mr Biden and Mr Trump harbour a misplaced nostalgia for the 1950s and '60s, and justify their policies by painting today's economy as weaker than it is. Mr Trump thinks trade and immigration have made 115 the country poorer; Mr Biden is deeply distrustful of big business. And where they do acknowledge America's strengths, both men attribute it to their own misguided interventionism. In fact, they are chipping away at the free markets which are the ultimate source of the 120 country's wealth.

The truth is America has **thrived** as its companies and workers have innovated and adapted to a rapidly changing world. If the next president does not recognise that, America's pumped-up economy will eventually 125 deflate.

On Soft Power

Document 8 - Whatever Happened to Soft Power?

Project Syndicate, Jan 11, 2022, JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

With the news dominated by dramatic examples of countries using coercion, intimidation, and payoffs to advance their interests, the power of attraction would seem to be irrelevant in international relations. But it still matters, and governments ignore its potential at their peril.

CAMBRIDGE – As 2021 drew to a close, Russia had massed troops near its border with Ukraine; China had flown military jets near Taiwan; North Korea was still pursuing its nuclear-weapons program; and Taliban fighters were patrolling the streets of Kabul. Seeing all this, friends asked me: "Whatever happened to soft power?"

5 One answer is that it can be found in other recent events, such as President Joe Biden's virtual Summit for Democracy, which was attended by representatives from more than 100 countries. Having been excluded, China took to the airwaves and social media to proclaim that it had a different and more stable type of democracy than the one being extolled by the United States. What we were seeing was a great-power competition over soft power, understood as the ability to influence others by attraction rather than by coercion or payment.

10 When I first wrote about soft power in 1990, I was seeking to overcome a deficiency in how analysts thought about power generally. But the concept gradually acquired more of a political resonance. In some respects, the underlying thought is not new; similar concepts can be traced back to ancient philosophers such as Lao Tse. Nor does soft power pertain only to international behavior or to the US. Many small countries and organizations also possess the power to attract; and in democracies, at least, soft power is an essential component of leadership.

15 Still, the concept is now generally associated with international relations. As the European Union developed into its current form, European leaders increasingly made use of the term. And ever since 2007, when then-Chinese President Hu Jintao declared that China must develop its soft power, the government has invested billions of dollars in that quest. The challenge now is for China to implement an effective *smart-power* strategy. If it can effectively pair its growing hard power with soft power, it will be less likely to provoke counter-balancing coalitions.

20 Soft power is not the only or even the most important source of power, because its effects tend to be slow and indirect. But to ignore or neglect it is a serious strategic and analytic mistake. The Roman Empire's power rested not only on its legions, but also on the attraction of Roman culture and law. Similarly, as a Norwegian analyst once described it, the American presence in Western Europe after World War II was "an empire by invitation." No barrage of artillery brought down the Berlin Wall; it was removed by hammers and bulldozers wielded by people who had been touched by Western soft power.

25 Smart political leaders have long understood that values can create power. If I can get you to want what I want, I will not have to force you to do what you do not want to do. If a country represents values that others find attractive, it can economize on the use of sticks and carrots.

30 A country's soft power comes primarily from three sources: its culture; its political values, such as democracy and human rights (when it upholds them); and its policies (when they are seen as legitimate because they are framed with an awareness of others' interests). A government can influence others through the example of how it behaves at home (such as by protecting a free press and the right to protest), in international institutions (consulting others and fostering multilateralism), and through its foreign policy (such as by promoting development and human rights).

35 During the COVID-19 pandemic, China has tried to use so-called "vaccine diplomacy" to bolster its soft power, which had been damaged by its secretive handling of the initial outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan. The government's efforts have been aimed at reinforcing its Belt and Road Initiative, which supports infrastructure projects in many parts of the world.

40 But international polls show that the results have been disappointing. In measures of attractiveness, China lags behind the US on all continents except Africa, where the two countries are tied. One reason for China's lower level of soft power is its heavy-handed use of hard power in pursuit of an increasingly nationalist foreign policy. This has been on full display in its economic punishment of Australia and in its military operations on the Himalayan border with India.

China has a smart-power problem. After all, it is difficult to practice vaccine diplomacy and "wolf-warrior diplomacy" (aggressive, coercive browbeating of smaller countries) at the same time.

45 True, international polls showed that the US also suffered a decline in soft power during Donald Trump's presidency. But, fortunately, America is more than its government. Unlike hard-power assets (such as armed forces), many soft-power resources are separate from the government and are only partly responsive to its purposes. For example, Hollywood movies showcasing independent women or protesting minorities inspire others around the world. So, too, does the charitable work of US foundations and the freedom of inquiry at American universities.

50 Firms, universities, foundations, churches, and protest movements develop soft power of their own. Sometimes their activities will reinforce official foreign-policy goals, and sometimes they will be at odds with them. Either way, these private sources of soft power are increasingly important in the age of social media.

55 The January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol certainly damaged US soft power. But those who would mourn the death of American democracy prematurely should bear in mind that the 2020 election drew an unprecedented turnout despite the pandemic. The American people are still able to unseat a demagogue in a free and fair election.

This is not to suggest that all is well with American democracy or its soft power. Trump eroded many democratic norms that now must be restored. Biden has made strengthening democracy at home and abroad a goal of his presidency, but the results remain to be seen.

60 No one can be certain about the future trajectory of any country's soft power. But there is no doubt that influence through attraction will remain an important component of world politics. As Mark Twain famously quipped, "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." The same is true of soft power.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a professor at Harvard University and a former US assistant secretary of defense, is the author, most recently, of *Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump* (Oxford University Press, 2020).

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Document 9- Les séries et la guerre des récits : retour sur le soft power des plateformes

The Conversation, 4 janvier 2022

Auteur, **Virginie Martin**, Docteure sciences politiques, HDR sciences de gestion, Kedge Business School

<https://theconversation.com/les-series-et-la-guerre-des-recits-retour-sur-le-soft-power-des-plateformes-173860>

(*I encourage you to go online. The text contains three videos, made by Virginie Martin, in which she analyses three series: La Casa de Papel, Squid Games et It's a Sin. There's also an interview of Darnell Moore*)

La guerre, la « vraie », est largement mise en scène dans bon nombre de séries : *Homeland*, *Le Bureau des légendes*, *Fauda* et tant d'autres.

Et puis il y a une autre guerre, celle dont parlait Antonio Gramsci, intellectuel communiste italien au début du XX^e siècle. Cette guerre là est plus immatérielle ; elle est livrée à des fins d'hégémonie culturelle.

Elle n'est pas sans rappeler le soft power – par opposition au hard power – cette « puissance douce » faite pour influencer, séduire, attirer.

Gagner cette bataille culturelle c'est travailler les opinions, les représentations dominantes, construire ou déconstruire les croyances.

Ce combat possède ses propres armes que sont les écoles, les livres, les médias et le monde de la fiction. Ces armes, ces appareils sont vus par Gramsci comme des moyens de domination, mais aussi d'attraction. Ils sont des foyers d'irradiation et des aimants. Culture cultivée et culture populaire sont primordiales dans cette bataille, les séries étant au cœur de la nébuleuse.

Gramsci ne dissocie jamais le culturel du politique, car selon lui le culturel peut mener jusqu'à l'activité pratique et collective. *La Casa de papel* n'a t-elle pas été prise pour symbole dans de nombreuses révoltes ?

Le monde culturel et ceux qui le fabriquent sont définitivement les architectes de la chose politique ; et les séries participent de cette dynamique, elles sont des moments politico-culturels. Elles construisent un objet politique, et enrichissent les approches autour du pouvoir.

Ce monde en séries est d'autant plus efficace qu'il vient se loger dans nos intimités, dans notre environnement familial, dans notre cocon.

Le côté émotionnel de la série permet une absorption très efficace des valeurs qu'elle peut donner à voir. Ces séries peuvent créer, de manière insidieuse ou plus explicite, un individu collectif, un individu politique via la pédagogie, le familial, l'émotionnel. Pour exemple, les vêtements-symboles des héros de *La Casa de papel* ont été repris ici où là comme habits de l'insoumission au libéralisme. Lors de

certains mouvements, tels les zadistes ou les cheminots en grève, ont été masques et combinaisons.

Ce monde sériel est porté par la puissance des plateformes, une puissance d'autant plus grande qu'elle sait parfaitement s'inscrire dans l'environnement liquide qui serait devenu le nôtre.

L'extra fluidité des plates-formes enjambe un monde solide

Les DAN – Disney, Amazon, Netflix – ne connaissent en effet quasiment aucune frontière. Elles sont transnationales, et dépassent largement les principes de souveraineté nationale.

Elles sont flexibles, totalement dématérialisées et correspondent au monde liquide décrit par Bauman.

Immatérielles et insaisissables, ces plateformes viennent se nicher là où sont leur intérêt, et leur fluidité leur donne une longueur d'avance pour gagner la guerre des récits dans un monde – quel que soit son degré de globalisation et de mondialisation – qui reste, lui, profondément ancré sur des nations, des pays, des territoires, des frontières.

Un soft power offshore. Elles exercent leur soft power à la façon dont Joseph Nye l'avait théorisé mais c'est un soft power qui n'est plus territorialisé.

Quand Joseph Nye parle du soft power dans les années 90 et veut convaincre les présidents américains de livrer une guerre culturelle plutôt qu'armée, il le fait notamment via les 2 H et les 2 M à savoir : Harvard, Hollywood, Mc Donald's et Macintosh. Ces outils du soft power passent par les interstices du quotidien indispensable : la nourriture, l'école, les loisirs, les outils de travail. C'est une mainmise sur la quasi-totalité du quotidien.

Ces armes de soft power ou d'hégémonie culturelle restent des entités concrètes, et surtout rattachées à un pays : Hollywood reste ancré en Californie. Harvard au Massachusetts. Le rattachement à un au pays est la raison même du soft power ; le plan Marshall avait déjà été largement pensé comme cela.

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, les plates-formes sont quasiment hors sol et offshore dirait Latour à savoir sans réel ancrage géographique dans nos imaginaires.

Les plates-formes n'ont quasi pas de territoires, pas plus que leurs productions. Elles parviennent à s'immiscer, via des fictions, en Jordanie – *Djinn* –, en Norvège, ou en Turquie – *Bir Baskadir* – elles viennent se saisir des enjeux nationaux et, simultanément, du pays en question.

En parallèle se joue une guerre marketing, une bataille pour l'attention. La présence sur le marché des séries peut signifier, en fonction des stratégies, inonder le marché ou ciseler des objets fictionnels très qualitatifs, ou encore investir massivement dans la promotion de ses séries.

Bien sûr, celui qui maîtrise toute la chaîne de production reste américain mais, c'est comme si, culturellement, on ne le voyait plus, comme si la patte américaine avait disparu. Des premiers temps de la *Casa de Papel* à *Leila* en passant Chernobyl, où sont les Etats-Unis ? On ne le sait plus tout à fait.

Netflix représente une technologie culturelle mutante qui joue à la guerre des récits. Capable de saper la souveraineté des pays, elle se détache de son territoire originel et finit par être un objet flottant qui ne nous dit plus d'où elle parle.

Ces DAN sont si puissants qu'ils jouent tels de véritables pays dans cette guerre sérielle ; et, simultanément, tous les pays, même les plus rétifs, s'embarquent dans cette bataille en séries.

Le soft power minimum : en être

De nombreux pays – Corée, Suède, Nigeria, Brésil... – savent qu'ils n'ont d'autre choix que de produire et diffuser leurs productions sérielles via les DAN, ce, afin de compter dans les représentations dominantes du monde. Regardons la ferveur à l'égard de la Corée à partir de sa K Pop, en passant par ses dramas, comme *My ID is Gangnam Beauty* ou par le succès de *Hellbound* ou de *_Squid game*

Les grandes puissances ont compris qu'il était indispensable de participer à cette guerre des récits. En être, c'est déjà une manière de prendre le pouvoir et c'est potentiellement empêcher l'autre de le prendre. Les séries ont véritable un pouvoir discursif au sens foucauldien du terme.

Certains veulent aussi « en être », mais à leur manière, et peuvent refuser de jouer le jeu des Netflix et autres. On pense à la Chine et la Russie – même si cette dernière est en train de modérer son approche ; deux pays qui sont plus proches du « sharp power » que du soft.

Du soft au sharp power

Dans cette guerre des récits, des pays plus autoritaires entendent jouer de leur influence un peu différemment ; de façon plus aiguë, plus belliqueuse. Les façons de faire seront celles du sharp power à savoir : gêner, voire déstabiliser les démocraties, mais aussi exister dans le périmètre régional et in fine atteindre la diaspora éparpillée de par le monde. Travailler à une certaine propagande, via l'institut Confucius ou des médias comme la chaîne de télévision Russia Today.

Le sharp power, selon les créateurs de ce concept, Christopher Walker et Jessica Ludwig, consiste à jouer avec des fake news [afin de fragiliser les démocraties occidentales]. Walter et Ludwig donnent quelques exemples, et différencient la Chine et la Russie sur ce plan.

Cette dernière va créer des rumeurs – par exemple, « le sida aurait été inventé en laboratoire par la CIA ». La Chine, elle, cible plutôt les leaders d'opinion : élites politiques, économiques intellectuelles, et cherche à convaincre que son système est conforme au modèle des démocraties libérales.

Le sharp power représente clairement une dynamique d'arsenalisation du soft power. (<https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-et-strategique-2019-3-page-39.htm>)

De l'antipopulisme au wokisme

Dans cette bataille des récits restent ceux qui ne veulent pas juste « en être » mais qui « sont », Netflix en tête. Ceux-là ont bien l'intention d'évangéliser le monde au regard de deux piliers.

Le premier est la figure détestée et honnie du « populiste ». De Trump à Modi en passant par Erdogan, les figures du « mal » politique sont en joue dans de nombreuses créations : *Leila* pour l'Inde, *Dir baskadir* pour la Turquie, *Jinn* pour la Jordanie, *Years and years* pour l'Europe nationaliste, *Occupied* pour la Russie

Le second concerne la promotion du « wokisme » ou la dénonciation des discriminations et une manière d'encourager l'empowerment des minorités. Les minorités et les personnes invisibilisées par la société sont largement mises à l'honneur dans cet univers sériel : *I May Destroy You*, *Little Fires Everywhere*, *Mrs. Maisel*, *Pose*, *Orange Is the New Black*, *Maid*, *It's a Sin*...

Toutes ces séries prônent une approche progressiste et intersectionnelle. Le tout orchestré – chez Netflix – par l'écrivain et activiste afro-américain Darnell Moore qui y est chargé de l'inclusivité.

Ces DAN, avec leurs séries « armées », sont tout à la fois des contenus et des contenants.

Plus que des entreprises multi- et transnationales, elles deviennent des objets culturels et politiques en tant que tels. Elles se confondent avec les séries qu'elles proposent et sont partie prenante de cette guerre des récits.

Ces entreprises toutes-puissantes sont quasiment devenues de nouveaux États, avec leur agenda, leurs budgets colossaux, leur politique, leur propre soft power. Mais des états fluides et sans territoires, annonçant les prémisses d'une nouvelle donne géopolitique.

Cet article a été rédigé avec le précieux concours de Jessica Cluzel (étudiante Kedge Business School) ; il est aussi le résultat d'une journée organisée par l'Irsem le 8 novembre 2021 autour des représentations du monde militaire dans les séries TV et le cinéma