


The Summer 2024 Race Riots – Is the UK Multicultural Model Broken?

See also Selection 3 (Far Right / Radical Right in the U.K.) on the Saclay Question

Document 1: STATISTICS FROM THE OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS AND MIGRATION OBSERVATORY

Figure 1: Provisional estimates indicate a slowing of immigration over the last year


Number of non-EU, EU, and British nationals immigrating into the UK, between YE June 2012 and YE June 2023



Source: International Passenger Survey from the Office for National Statistics, Home Office Borders and Immigration data from the Home Office, Registration and Population Interactions Database from the Department for Work and Pensions


Figure 3: Before the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, migration was relatively stable; migration has increased sharply since 2021 because of a rise of non-EU immigration

Net migration of non-EU, EU, and British nationals in the UK, between YE June 2012 and YE June 2023




Source: International Passenger Survey from the Office for National Statistics, Home Office Borders and Immigration data from the Home Office, Registration and Population Interactions Database from the Department for Work and Pensions

Top ten countries of birth and nationality among migrants in the UK Year ending June 2021



Migrant workers across economic sectors, 2022

Age 16-64



Migrants are over-represented in the IT and communications, transport and storage, and hospitality sectors

In 2022, nearly one in five workers born in non-EU countries worked in the health and care sector (19%), almost twice as many as the next most common sector: retail (10%) (Figure 7). Workers born in Sub-Saharan Africa and East & Southeast Asia were more likely to work in health and care than any other region-of-origin group, although workers from these regions did different types of work in the sector: 42% of Sub-Saharan Africans were care workers, while 40% of East & Southeast Asians were working as nurses.

By contrast, EU workers were more evenly distributed across sectors, with manufacturing, retail, health, and care the most common. Almost a third of workers born in EU-8 countries were working in either retail or manufacturing jobs in 2022, while workers from EU-14 countries were most likely to work in education.

Document 2: “WHY BRITAIN’S MIGRATION PROBLEM ISN’T GOING AWAY”

POLITICO, NOVEMBER 2, 2022. Adapted

A crisis at a processing facility in southern England reveals deeper-seated problems.

LONDON — If Britain thought leaving the EU would solve its worries about migration, it was wrong.

Tory hard-liner Suella Braverman is just the latest in a long line of U.K. home secretaries to try — and, so far, fail — to solve the problem.

5 “The system is broken,” Braverman told the House of Commons on Monday. “**Illegal migration** is out of control.” But the broader picture is complex, and bleak. Arrivals across the Channel are **steadily increasing**, from 8,400 in 2020 to 28,500 in 2021, and up to about 40,000 this year.

“One of the reasons people believe we have the small boats phenomenon in the first place is that it is the result of successful enforcement around the lorry terminals in northern France,” said Madeleine Sumption, director of the

10 University of Oxford's Migration Observatory. "So if you close off one route, you create pressure for people to explore new options."

Europe's crisis

Britain, of course, is just the last link of the chain.

Asylum seeker numbers have been rising all over the EU over recent years, reaching levels unseen since the 2015
15 **refugee crisis**¹, and putting processing systems across the Continent under heavy strain. **Lack of** accommodation is an equally painful issue in countries such as Austria, where the government has started to house refugees in tents. Astonishingly, more than 100,000 asylum seekers are currently awaiting a decision from the Home Office, and as they wait in limbo they must be financially supported by the **taxpayer** as they are banned from working under U.K. law. Seemingly unable either to speed up the processing of asylum applications or to halt **the crossings** themselves,
20 successive **home secretaries** have instead focused on the only other option available: **removals**.

In April 2022, the U.K. sealed a £120-million deal with Rwanda to offshore asylum seekers to the Eastern African country. Seven months on, no removal flight has even left the runway amid a flurry of challenges in the courts.

Patel also **struck a** bilateral **deal** with the Albanian government last year to accelerate returns of Albanian nationals who fail to obtain asylum, after a sudden spike in the arrivals from the Balkan nation². The Home Office blames the
25 surge on family pull factors, specific targeting by Albanian **people-smugglers**, and a new route into Europe through the Balkans.

British and Albanian officials and police officers are now working closely together in a bid **to tackle the migratory flows** at their source. Braverman told parliament the scheme has "had some success in removing people back to Albania within quite a short period of time," but admitted it

30 must "go further and faster" to make a real impact.

In the years after the 2016 Brexit vote, successive Conservative governments had insisted a patchwork of similar bilateral return deals with EU nations would prove the ideal substitute for the EU-wide migration system which
35 is meant to coordinate **asylum requests** among member countries. Britain chose to leave this so-called Dublin convention when it departed the wider bloc in 2020. But no such deals with EU nations have been signed.


EU member countries are resisting Britain's demands that
40 migrants be returned to the first country deemed safe which they enter into. Accepting this logic would see EU countries on the front line of mass arrivals — such as Greece, and others on the Continent's southern border — having to accept even more asylum seekers into their already-crowded
45 systems.

The U.K. has engaged bilaterally with Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland on asylum — only to be told that it needs to speak to Brussels directly.

In the meantime, thousands more people keep crossing **the Channel** each week.

Where do the people crossing the channel come from?

Small boat arrivals by nationality, January to December 2022



*Nationality of the person not recorded at the time of data collection

Source: Home Office

BBC

¹ In 2015, there were about 15 million refugees throughout the world and more than 1.5 million asylum seekers. Contrary to a popular belief Europe has a relatively small percentage of refugees compared to countries in Asia and Africa: a mere 8% of the world's refugees reside in Europe. The number of displaced people dramatically increased since the onset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, rising from 20 000 to 4.6 million in 2015. Most of them fled to neighbouring countries such as Lebanon (1 million refugees out of a population of 4.4 million), Turkey (1.5 million) and Jordan (roughly 650 000). In Europe, refugees tended to settle in northern countries like Germany and Sweden. That said, according to the Dublin III agreements, many refugees have to apply for asylum in the country where they first set foot, which is generally Italy, Greece, Hungary or Bulgaria.

² Balkans expert Andi Hoxhaj estimated that around 40% of people leave Albania for "economic opportunities". Three decades after the collapse of Enver Hoxha's dictatorship and the opening of Albania's borders, about 60% of the country's adult population wanted to leave, according to a Gallup poll published in December 2018. They cited corruption, low salaries, poor working conditions and a low quality of life as their main reasons.

Document 3: "WHAT IS THE UK'S PLAN TO SEND ASYLUM SEEKERS TO RWANDA?"

BBC NEWS, 13 Jun 2024

Plans for the UK to send some asylum seekers to Rwanda were passed by Parliament, but are still facing legal challenges.

What is the Rwanda asylum plan?


In April 2022, the government said that any asylum seeker entering the UK "illegally" after 1 January 2022, from a safe country such as France, could be sent to Rwanda.

They would have their asylum claims processed there, rather than in the UK.

If successful, they could be granted refugee status and allowed to stay in the landlocked east-central African country.

People crossing the English Channel in boats

Cumulative total people detected by year



If not, they could apply to settle in Rwanda on other grounds, or seek asylum in another "safe third country".

No asylum seeker would be able to apply to return to the UK.

The government says the plan will **deter** people **from** arriving in the UK on small boats across the English Channel, a key priority for Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

As of 11 June, 11,247 people had crossed the Channel in 2024 - above the numbers for the same period in the previous four years. Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer said he will scrap the Rwanda scheme if he wins the election.

The Liberal Democrats and the SNP also say the policy should be cancelled, because it breaks international law.

What is the Rwanda bill and what legal challenges is it facing?

After the Supreme Court ruled that the scheme was **unlawful**, the government introduced a bill to make clear in UK law that Rwanda is a safe country.

The legislation - which was finally approved after intense political wrangling - orders the courts to ignore key sections of the Human Rights Act.

It also compels the courts to disregard other British laws or international rules - such as the international Refugee Convention - which would block deportations to Rwanda.

The UK government also signed a new migration treaty with Rwanda, which Home Secretary James Cleverly said guarantees that anyone sent there would not risk being returned to their home country.

The Rwanda Bill was fiercely **criticised** by opposition parties and by many charities representing asylum seekers.

Mr Sunak said that 25 courtrooms and 150 judges were available to deal with any legal cases, and there were "500 highly trained individuals ready to escort illegal migrants all the way to Rwanda", with a further 300 awaiting training.

Is Rwanda safe and what was the Supreme Court ruling?

In November 2023, the UK Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Rwanda scheme was unlawful.

It said **genuine** refugees would be at risk of being returned to their home countries, where they could face harm.

This breaches the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits torture and inhuman treatment. The UK is a signatory to the ECHR. The ruling also cited concerns about Rwanda's poor human rights record, and its past treatment of refugees.

Judges said that in 2021, the UK government had itself criticised Rwanda over "extrajudicial killings, deaths in custody, enforced disappearances and torture".

After Keir Starmer and the Labour Party won the 2024 general election, Starmer announced that the Rwanda plan would be **cancelled** and replaced by the Border Security Command, a proposed law enforcement agency in the United Kingdom **to be responsible for** coordinating the activities of Immigration Enforcement, MI5, Border Force and the National Crime Agency **to attempt to** tackle **smuggling** gangs which facilitate illegal migrant crossings over the English Channel.

The Economist, 8 August 2024, adapted

Punish the thugs. Stand up for immigration. And improve local services.

Repulsive is a strong word. It is not strong enough for the behaviour marring Britain's streets. Ever since three little girls were slain in Southport on July 29th, indefensible anti-immigration protests have flared across towns and cities in England and Northern Ireland.

Some of the worst **race riots** since the Second World war hardly fit the image of a newly stable Britain sought by the incoming Labour government. Some countries have issued warnings urging people to exercise caution visiting Britain. Elon Musk, a man who must be clever but constantly finds new ways to make you wonder, has given his view on X, the social-media platform he owns: "Civil war is inevitable."

That is patently false. Many of the **troublemakers** over the past few days have been youngsters drawn by the thrill of mindless violence rather than by the application of revolutionary theory. Justice will have a **deterrent** effect on many: rioters have been a lot less defiant in front of a judge than when they were part of the mob.

One reason the extreme right has gone from being an organised political force to something amorphous is that Britain is an increasingly liberal country. Large counter-protests have begun to take place **in support of** immigrant communities. Only 17% of people now say that it is very important for being truly British to have been born in Britain, down from 48% in 1995. The recent election was a crushing defeat for a government that had campaigned **to clamp down hard on illegal immigration**.

Yet the clashes may not be over. And even if Britain is not about to wage civil war, the rioting is more than just a passing bout of summer violence. Immigration has become the running sore of British politics, **owing to** a mix of real problems and political opportunism.

The asylum system is in a mess. Although extremists do not thrive in elections, the right wing of British politics does provide cover for hostility to migrants. When the Conservatives were in office, they were prepared to flout international law **to deport** asylum-seekers arriving across the English Channel in small boats. Nigel Farage, the leader of Reform UK, uses dog-whistle language about "societal decline" and

"**two-tier policing**" (treating protests by white Britons more harshly than others, for example the Black Lives Matters protests of 2020, or more recent pro-Palestine marches) to signal that his party is the natural home for people who may not **take to the streets** but do dislike migrants. Polling by YouGov shows that a third of Reform UK voters believe the disorder is justified, compared with 12% of Britons **overall**.

It would therefore be unwise to think the riots should be forgotten as soon as they die down. Because the violence may accelerate the online processes of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, Britain's far-right problems could get worse. That means the government must combine robust justice and thoughtful **policy**—punishing the **lawbreakers** but drawing people who are open to democratic politics away from **the fringes**; being careful not to indulge anti-immigrant prejudice but tackling the sense of grievance on which **populists** feed.

Robust justice is the simpler part of this equation. Speedy trials and sentencing are the best way to deter continued violence: the first criminals have already been named and jailed. Given the role that online networks play in organising protests and fomenting hatred, **suing** people who call for violence from their keyboards is also crucial. The police themselves must also become more agile in their response to **misinformation**; it took them several hours to rebut posts that said the Southport attacker was a Muslim asylum-seeker—lies used by influencers to incite the first disturbances.

An **unequivocal** response to **thuggery** is not enough, however. To gradually draw the poison from immigration requires three parallel approaches. The first is to take every opportunity to bust anti-immigration myths. The riots have prompted much talk about the failure of multiculturalism. In fact, **integration** is something the country does exceptionally well. In England teenagers who do not speak English as their first language are more likely to obtain good grades in maths and English in national **GCSE exams** than native English-speakers. Not every migrant assimilates, but every ethnic group has become less segregated since the census started keeping track in 1991. Talk of two-tier policing is false, too. Although the authorities have sometimes trodden too lightly for

fear of offending sensibilities, the claim that white people are treated less fairly than **ethnic minorities** is nonsense. In the year ending in March 2023, the police carried out 24.5 stop-and-searches for every 1,000 black people and 5.9 for every 1,000 white people.

Telling people that immigration works will not succeed so long as bits of the system patently do not. The second element is to end the most damaging and visible policy **failures**. Processing asylum claims as fast as possible would make it easier to stop cramming large numbers of migrants into hotels, often in **deprived** areas. That policy has done more than any other to waste money and provoke locals' fury.

Back to basics

The third approach involves the unglamorous work of local **politics**. Some people are angry because of

immigration itself. But many more are angry because of **run-down** local government and public services, starting in the years of **austerity**. The miles covered by bus routes fell between 2009-10 and 2019-20; in that time, a third of England's **libraries** closed; **GP** appointments are harder to come by. When public services are **scarce resources** to be fought over, immigrants are more likely to become targets; when lives are hard, confidence in mainstream politics falls and people take action themselves.

In an online essay for *The Economist*, Dame Margaret Hodge, a former Labour MP, writes how tackling bread-and-butter local concerns sidelined **white nationalists** in her constituency in the 2000s. That is good policy anyway. It is also a vital response to the violence disfiguring Britain's streets.

Document 5: "ARE BRITAIN RIOTERS REPRESENTATIVE OF VIEW ON IMMIGRATION?"

The Economist, 8 August 2024 (adapted)

Young men chuck bricks, but the old have the sharpest views.

Britons tend to see the world **through the lens of** social class. For Matthew Goodwin, an expert on the radical right, the riots that have sullied Britain are fired by popular anger against "a new ruling class", an "elite minority" that wants uncontrolled immigration. Tommy Robinson, a much-prosecuted demagogue, speaks of a clash between "hard-working family men" and "the establishment".

Certainly, the worst rioting has been in deprived towns and cities like Hartlepool, Hull, Liverpool, Middlesbrough and Rotherham. Although it is too early to know who the rioters are, one of the first to be convicted was Joshua Simpson, a 25-year-old self-employed builder who is homeless. Lee Anderson, an MP for the anti-immigration Reform UK party, describes the rioters as "British **working-class** lads" who have had one too many drinks.

Does this point to a class divide over immigration? **Data** show that white Britons divide along occupational lines, but not **straightforwardly**, and not as much as they divide along other lines.

A poll last year by the British Election Study found that among members of social grade A (high-level managers and professionals) 23% wanted much less immigration, compared with 42% of those in grade E, who hold low-level jobs **or live on benefits**. Yet there is little sign of an elite with distinctively liberal views, if that term means people with elite jobs. All the middle-class groups, A, B and C1, think similarly.

Working-class white people are more opposed, but there is a wrinkle. The C2 group, comprising **skilled** manual workers, is more opposed to immigration than people in group D (semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers). That matches a poll taken after the general election on July 4th by Ipsos, which found that people in the C2 group were the most likely group to have voted for Reform UK. Skilled manual workers might feel more **threatened** by immigrants because they have more to lose.

If social class shapes attitudes in complex ways, age does so powerfully and reliably. Every age group is more opposed to immigration than younger ones. The differences are huge: people over 65 are more than three times more likely to




CHART: THE ECONOMIST

want much less immigration than 18- to 25-year-olds. Age may explain some of the class pattern: social group E is older than the others. Nigel Farage, Reform UK's leader, **boasted** before the election that youngsters were flocking to his party. In the end, they were less likely to vote Reform UK than any other age group.

Today Britons differ in their attitudes to migration but not in their attitudes to the riots. Polls by YouGov show that only 7% of people support the unrest, and just 4% think the rioters should receive unusually **lenient** sentences, with **scarcely** any social differences. Hardly anyone likes **a thug**.

Document 6: "UK RIOTS: FIVE ESSENTIAL READS ON WHAT TRIGGERED A WEEK OF VIOLENCE"

The Conversation, 9 August 2024

What happened to cause this dark episode?

1. The middle-aged radicals

A particular demographic was in evidence among the hordes of people clashing with police in English towns and cities in recent 5 days. A surprising number of men in their 40s and 50s were filmed screaming unspeakable racism as though it were indisputable fact.

Researchers funded by the European Union say they've come across such people during their investigations into what is being 10 called middle-aged radicalisation.

What seems to be happening is a **toxic** generational idiosyncrasy. A group of people too old to be **digital natives** taught themselves how to use the internet in adulthood and failed to emerge with the skills needed to navigate the **fake news** environment. These same people also happen to be more influential in their communities than younger, more **internet-savvy** generations.

15 So they are both **prone to** falling for conspiracy theories and well placed to spread them:

When groups of any kind are ignored, their feelings of exclusion and isolation make the fringes of the internet more appealing. Here, disgruntlement is fed and encouraged. People are invited to express their anger as they engage with peers of a similar age and socio-economic group.

The fact that middle-aged people are often culturally **overlooked** has not helped, either.

20

2. The political elites who enabled Islamophobia

Initially, the **unrest** was **triggered** by misinformation spread about the identity of a teenager who has been arrested over the deaths of three children in a mass knife attack. It was incorrectly suggested that he was a Muslim and an immigrant. That night, a group descended on a local mosque and attacked.

25 Even when the disinformation was corrected, hotels housing asylum seekers continued to be targets. Every **subsequent** scene of unrest has been characterised by racist chanting and threats.

The UK's Muslim population has been terrorised in their homes and places of worship with the complicity of many of the country's politicians. The recently deposed Conservative government fought an election on a platform of antagonism towards immigrants and allowed its leaders (including former prime minister Boris Johnson) to spread 30 brazen **hatred** about Muslims.

But the blame is not confined to the right and must be shared across the political spectrum:

*Few politicians can be seen to **truly** care about Islamophobia. As a result, it is rendered unimportant by most politicians and the parties they represent. Despite some **paying lip service to** the matter, it always quickly disappears from the political agenda.*

35

3. The phoney 'masculinity' of racists



Alamy/Benjamin Wareing

That the victims of the Southport knife attack were young girls provided an opportunity for nationalist extremists to paint themselves as defenders of women and children. Placards reading “save our kids” became a common sight at the far-right gatherings.

40 This is a familiar refrain that has been internalised by ultra-nationalists, writes terrorism expert Elizabeth Pearson:

*White supremacy is founded on the narrative of a specifically gendered and **racialised** threat – the threat from “other” men to “native” women and children. This idea is the undercurrent to the Nazi slogan Kinder, Küche, Kirche (children, kitchen, church) which situates women inside and men outside the home. It’s explicit in the so-called “14 words”, the most famous slogan in white nationalism, which urges followers to “secure a future” for white children.*

45 In these protests, we’re witnessing a dangerous convergence of **old-fashioned** racism and modern “manosphere” **tropes** that call on men to get fighting fit to defend “their” people. And of course, as is so often the case, influencer Andrew Tate had plenty to say on the matter as the week unfolded.

50 4. The unspoken problem of English nationalism

Those outside the UK should note that while we do refer to this as a British problem, it’s technically the case that the riots have been almost exclusively confined to England. There were incidents in Northern Ireland but not in Scotland or **Wales**, the other two nations of the UK.

This geographic detail is absolutely fundamental to understanding the problem, since a particular form of **English**
55 **nationalism** has been festering in our politics for some time.

Brexit is part of the picture but so is the slightly more mundane concept of **devolution**. Scotland and Wales are culturally and politically different since the 1997 Act that gave them their own governments. England, by contrast, has no legislature of its own. This appears to have contributed to feelings of **resentment** and fuelled anti-immigrant sentiment.

60 5. The hypocrisy of in-group logic

Mere weeks before the Southport attack, another tragedy happened in a British town. In this case, a white man killed a young black boy called Daniel Anjorin with a sword.

The murder triggered **no** rioting **whatsoever**, which is key to our understanding of what’s really going on in the UK,
65 writes Nilufar Ahmed. While the white man was treated as an exceptional case, the Southport attacker was treated as representative of an entire group of people:

This automatic psychological response explains how people can see the self and the in-group as complex and fluid (for example, not all white people are criminals) but frame the out-group as homogeneous and fixed. This can lead, as we’ve seen, to some people casting all black men as dangerous, Muslims as terrorists, asylum seekers as opportunistic and refugees as “taking” jobs and healthcare resources, justifying the dislike and even hatred of the out-group.

70 This in-group/out-group mentality is in evidence in other parts of British life, beyond the riots. Ahmed argues that this has created ideal conditions for **scapegoating** and racism.

Document 7: “THE OBSERVER VIEW ON THE UK RIOTS: POLITICAL NEGLECT LIES BEHIND OUR FRACTURED COMMUNITIES”

The Observer, 11 August 2024

The government needs to commission a proper inquiry into the origins of the past week’s unrest, and the role of the far right.

Last Wednesday, businesses closed early and shops boarded up in anticipation of **an outbreak of** far-right violence in some parts of the country. Six thousand trained police officers were on standby to respond. In the end, relatively few agitators were dwarfed by huge **crowds** of anti-racist demonstrators sending a message that the far-right were not welcome in their communities.

5 Effort must now be devoted to understanding what drove this far-right **hijacking** of the killing of three young girls, propelled by misinformation about the identity of their attacker. The government needs to commission a proper **inquiry** into who instigated it, who took part and the **underlying** causes.

The review must look at the role that far-right ideology and organisation played, **including** the spread of misinformation online. The far right has long exploited the issue of asylum hotels, as highlighted in a 2024 review by the government's social cohesion adviser, Sara Khan; in 2023, protests outside a Merseyside hotel used to house asylum seekers turned into violent clashes with the police. Extremists of all types have become **adept at using** disinformation and **conspiracy theories** to attract and provoke people online. That creates an even more challenging context for the Prevent programme whose objective is to prevent the radicalisation of individuals into far-right, Islamist and other forms of extremism. Social media companies should be doing more to reduce the spread of **harmful** misinformation; the Online Safety Act³ is yet to be fully implemented and should help, but it is complex to design **levers** that work effectively without compromising lawful **free expression** online.

In light of **evidence** that most of the 2011 riots occurred in areas ranking in the bottom 10% on measures of social cohesion, the government needs to develop a proper **social cohesion** strategy. Khan highlights that cohesion is a much broader concept than **integration**. **The former** is about supporting “diverse yet established citizens and communities to live well together and be resilient to inevitable tensions that will occur from time to time”; that includes intra-minority and intra-faith tension. **The latter** is about helping new arrivals to integrate into British life.

Too much commentary in recent days has loosely attributed the riots to poor levels of integration; in fact, the UK performs relatively well on certain measures of integration, with sustained intergenerational falls in levels of **prejudice**, gradual decreases in levels of residential **segregation**, and second-generation immigrant children **outperforming** non-immigrant children at school. However, there are examples of incidents flaring up and being dealt with very poorly by local authorities; for example, the **appalling** treatment of the teacher in Batley, West Yorkshire, forced to go into hiding after he taught a lesson on free speech and blasphemy that included images of the prophet Muhammad.

Finally, community cohesion is inevitably **undermined** by **economic hardship**. Too many people have poor experiences of a dysfunctional housing market, insufficient economic opportunities and cannot access good public services. This is the product of years of political failure and creates fertile territory for rightwing populists to blame the country's ills on immigrants: such populism has dominated Conservative politics for the past decade and found recent success in the guise of Reform. There are **legitimate** debates to be had about the right levels of immigration and how asylum should work; what is illegitimate is **pretending** that immigration is responsible for the underfunding of the **NHS**, or a lack of school places, or the high cost of housing, when they are overwhelmingly the product of political choices.

Document 8: “BRITAIN HAS MANY LEVERS FOR CONTROLLING MIGRATION. WHICH ONES SHOULD IT PULL?”

The Economist, 15 August 2024

Labour won power on July 4th after declaring that Britain had too much immigration, and **pledging** to cut it. The new government promptly ran into the problem that has floored its predecessors. Whatever they may say, ministers have little control over the number of asylum-seekers reaching the country. Those migrants, who are often **resented**—witness the attacks on hotels used to house them during a wave of racist riots in early August—are driven mostly by wars and geopolitical forces. Nor does the government have much say over the number of arriving Hong Kongers and Ukrainians, to whom it gives special visas.

But it does wield great power over the workers, students and dependants who make up **the bulk of** immigrants. Indeed, it has more power over them than it used to. Now that Britain has left the EU, freedom of movement is no more.




CHART: THE ECONOMIST

³ The **Online Safety Act 2023** is a new set of laws that protects children and adults online. It puts a range of new **duties** on social media companies and search services, making them more **responsible** for their users' safety on their platforms. There are duties about **illegal content**, content **harmful** to children and new criminal offenses (encouraging or assisting serious **self-harm**, **cyberflashing**, sending false information intended to cause harm, threatening communications, intimate image abuse, epilepsy trolling).

And the new government has inherited other controls over immigration that it **lacked** in 2010. Family migration is now subject to a salary **threshold**, which Labour seems minded to keep.

Given all this power, what should the government do? Immigration is **a boon**, at least at first: the Office for Budget Responsibility, the fiscal **watchdog**, estimated in March that higher-than-expected net migration would cut net borrowing by £7.4bn (\$9.5bn, or 0.3% of GDP) in four years' time, thanks to the migrants' taxes. But Britons are growing more concerned, perhaps because net migration reached a near-record 685,000 last year. With the Conservative and Reform UK parties likely to bang on about immigration, Labour will probably want to demonstrate control, even stinginess.

Britain has largely avoided two policies that other rich countries have tried: guest-worker programmes and points-based immigration systems, which let people in if they are young and highly qualified, even if they do not have a job. It would be wise to stay clear of both. Guest workers have a distressing tendency to become permanent, and do not integrate well; that kind of migration is better suited to insular autocracies like Saudi Arabia. Points-based systems in countries like Australia leave many immigrants unemployed to begin with. They catch up later.

Although British ministers have often claimed to be **enacting** an Australian-style points system, the government actually **relies on** companies and universities to screen immigrants. It sets minimum salary thresholds for workers. If you can find a firm that will pay you £38,700 (\$49,300) a year, or the going rate for a job if it is higher, then you are in, together with your dependants. The threshold is lower for young people and workers in some occupations.

In theory, a salary threshold is a powerful tool for controlling immigration, although Britain's experience has been mixed. In April the threshold was raised from £26,200. That has not obviously affected the number of visa applications, which stood at 11,800 in July, slightly higher than a year earlier.

A simpler, better option would be to apply the salary threshold to more jobs. The British government has carved out many exceptions, especially for immigrants who are ultimately paid by the government itself. Last year almost 350,000 **work visas**, three-quarters of the total, went to health and care workers. They can be paid as little as £23,200 a year, or £11.90 an hour. The industry loves them.

It is worth remembering, though, that immigrants as a whole fare pretty well. A forthcoming research paper for the Migration Observatory finds that migrants from outside Europe who started working in 2021 earned 97% of the median British wage in the second year and 104% in the third year. Changes to the immigration rules could improve the system. It already works well.

**Document 9: “DEBATING THE ‘SUCCESS’ OF MULTICULTURALISM MISSES THE POINT – IT’S
SIMPLY PART OF LIFE IN BRITAIN TODAY”**

The Conversation, 3 October 2023

Suella Braverman – the [former] **home secretary** – has declared that multiculturalism has failed, with “people to come to our society and live parallel lives in it”.

I am a historian of multiculturalism, and grew up in Balsall Heath, an area of Birmingham with a decades-long history of rich cultural diversity. My experience of multiculturalism is not as something that can fail or succeed, but as something that shaped my life and that of my peers in a meaningful way. Comments like Braverman's – and indeed, other politicians before her – ignore the reality of what multiculturalism means to people.

In the early 2000s, Labour home secretary David Blunkett introduced a range of measures to address the notion that multiculturalism had contributed to a lack of “community cohesion” in Britain. These measures aimed to promote “British values” and prevent local schools from becoming “swamped” by immigrants.

The criticism of multiculturalism from recent governments contrasts with the approach taken in the 1970s and 80s. The 1976 Race Relations Act decreed that councils take proactive steps to bring about “good relations” between different racial groups. In the years following, local councils enacted policies of multiculturalism, particularly in education, to cater for the particular needs of ethnically diverse communities. There was a drive to allow pupils to wear religious clothing and provide information to parents in their first languages. **Halal meat** was made available in

schools with a **significant** number of Muslim pupils. Councils also began to distribute funding to religious organisations, in the hope that this would help bring about better community relations.

How multiculturalism actually exists

Multiculturalism is not only a policy or a political agenda, but a way of life. This is most apparent in Britain's major cities, where immigrants from the Caribbean, South Asia and elsewhere settled in the 1950s and 60s.

By the 1960s in Balsall Heath, an **inner city area** of Birmingham in the Midlands, one in four residents were black or Asian, and 13% of the population were Irish. When I grew up in the same area in the 1990s, more than 75% of local residents were from ethnic minority backgrounds.

My peers and I were familiar and comfortable with our cultural differences. Friends explained the significance of Ramadan or the *kara* (the iron bangle often worn by Sikhs) in between lessons and **unruly** games of football. We even had a particular way of speaking. Our multicultural slang mixed Punjabi insults such as *teri maa di...* (your mother's...) with snippets of Jamaican patois.

A generation later, another local resident, Bally Sagoo, became a star of the British bhangra music scene. His distinctive fusions of traditional Punjabi music with hip-hop, reggae and funk earned him the first Hindi-language single to make the UK top 40 in 1996.

The picture today

Multiculturalism is one of the most significant social transformations across Britain as a whole over the last 100 years. In 1942, it was estimated that fewer than 5% of the population had experienced any direct contact with someone from an ethnic minority background. In 1958, almost 75% of people disapproved of mixed-race relationships. In 2012, that figure had dropped to just 15%.

By 2021, more than a third of the population of England were either migrants themselves or else had parents or grandparents born outside of the UK. Birmingham had become one of two cities in which a majority of residents were from **ethnic minority** populations. And Britain's **mixed-race** population was approaching two million people. The kind of diversity that I experienced in the 1990s is now a central pillar of the fabric of modern Britain.

This is not to downplay the structural issues that continue to affect ethnic minority communities in Britain, alongside the stubborn, pernicious presence of racism. Rather, it points to the problem with the tired debates about the "failure" of multiculturalism.

Despite Braverman's comments, having a home secretary of Mauritian-Kenyan heritage, serving under Rishi Sunak, Britain's first ethnic minority prime minister, only illuminates the extent to which Britain has now become **irreversibly** multicultural.

Document 10 - There can be no excuses. The UK riots were violent racism fomented by populism

David Olusoga

Culture wars have poisoned political debate, normalised Islamophobia and opened wounds that a generation blighted by nativism hoped had closed

The Observer, Sat 10 Aug 2024

Perhaps unhelpfully, we use the term "race riot" to describe two very different phenomena, each with its own dismal history. In the 1980s, it was the term attached to the uprisings that erupted among Black communities in Liverpool, Bristol, Leeds, London and elsewhere. Outbreaks of lawlessness and violence that were in large part a response to racial targeting by the police: harassment that aggravated existing disadvantages and intensified deep disillusionment, especially among the younger generation who had been born in Britain.

However, a very different set of events with a far longer history has also been defined as race riots. The deadly disturbances of 1919 in Liverpool, Cardiff, Glasgow, London, Salford, Newport, Barry, Hull and South Shields, like the riots that came again to Liverpool in 1948, and those that broke out in 1958 in Nottingham and London's Notting Hill.

In each of the latter cases, the rioters were mobs of white men. The grievance that brought them on to the streets was the presence in their cities of non-white people. We must now add the summer of 2024 to the

list of riots that were in essence organised violence against minority communities. My generation, brought up amid the endemic racism of the 1980s, had in recent years started to believe that our memories of being assaulted on the streets or besieged in our homes belonged firmly to a 20th-century Britain that we had long ago left behind. Now members of another generation of Britons from minority communities have traumatic memories that they too will have to process later in life.



Continuing a 'long and ugly history' of British race riots, a mob attacks police outside a Rotherham hotel housing asylum seekers. Photograph: Joel Goodman/LNP

While there were horrific attacks on hotels housing asylum seekers most of those targeted by the rioters were British citizens

An understanding of the long and ugly history of the second type of British "race riot" might have helped some of the journalists and commentators who last week attempted to explain the causes of the wave of violence and looting we have just witnessed. The initial category error, made by much of the media, was to describe riots as protests. That misstep led to later difficulties. It convinced editors of the need to adopt the increasingly unviable stance of "bothsidesism" and to go in search of deeper social causes behind the violence. Race riots of the sort Britain experienced in 1919, 1948 and 1958 have always had the same motivations – racism and nativism.

As brave reportage gave way to fumbling analysis, one fundamental reality was repeatedly overlooked. While there were horrific attacks on hotels housing asylum seekers, most of those targeted by the rioters were British citizens: members of communities with histories that go back three generations or more. When the mobs in Rotherham launched their sickening assault on a hotel, the racial slur spray-painted on to that hotel's walls was the P-word, aimed not at asylum

seekers but squarely at the established British Muslim community.

Riots are not protests and there is a difference between motivations and excuses. Despite much that has been said, the riots of 2024 were not born of "legitimate grievances" about poverty, underinvestment and the breakdown of basic services, all supposedly deepened by mass immigration. The people attacked on the streets, those who had to defend their places of worship or their homes, are the neighbours of the rioters. They live in the same towns and suffer the consequences of the exact same poverty and underinvestment.

Those who live in Britain's long list of neglected towns – such as Gateshead, where I grew up, which ranks as the 47th poorest of England's 317 local authorities – have no shortage of entirely legitimate grievances. But that is true irrespective of their race or religion. The Britain of 2024 is by some measures the most unequal society in Europe. Real wages have not increased since 2008 and the lowest-income British households are 20% poorer than the lowest-income families in France. But those bleak realities are the result of long-term political choices, not asylum seekers huddled terrified in hotels.

The ideological fanaticism of the Thatcher government that limited the ability of local authorities to use income generated from the sale of council houses to build new properties, the ideologically driven impoverishment of local government by the Cameron-Osborne government and the self-inflicted wound of Brexit: these and other factors are what lie behind the shocking lack of access to basic resources – social housing, doctor's appointments and dental surgeries. Immigration, rather than worsening that situation, is one of the few levers we have to increase access to medical care. Skilled immigration will also be needed if we are to build the millions of homes needed.

To put the violence directed at British Muslims, Black Britons and asylum seeking down to "legitimate grievances" is to fall for one of the most toxic and intentionally divisive falsehoods in the populist handbook: the myth that class and race are diametrically opposed, the assertion that non-white people have no class identity. In this distorted world view, the true working class are the "white working class", and the difficulties they face are not a consequences of political choices that affect everyone, irrespective of ethnicity, skin colour or faith, but of "elites" putting the needs of minority communities first. As if those minorities are not themselves working class. Boris Johnson's disastrous government pushed that falsehood whenever it got the chance.

However, a defining characteristic of the populist right – both politicians and their enablers at the tabloids and online – is an absolute, ironclad, unwavering refusal to take responsibility for the consequences of their own actions. They scuttled away from the wreckage of Brexit – always built on an economic fairytale – pointing accusatory fingers at others as their most cherished political project decimated Britain’s trade, shrank the economy and trashed our international reputation – as had been both predicted and forewarned. Now, eight years later, they are equally determined to sidestep responsibility for the long-term consequences of their short-term electoral strategies. A nation that was led for three years by a prime minister who used ethnic and racial slurs against Muslim women and African children, in which newspaper columnists were allowed to describe asylum seekers as “vermin” and in which those same papers constantly and deliberately conflated the separate issues of immigration and asylum: such a nation, sooner or later, was always going to face consequences.

Just as with Brexit, the consequences of populism and culture wars were both foreseen and forewarned. Among the Cassandras whose prophecies went unheeded was the Conservative party’s former co-chairwoman Baroness Sayeeda Warsi. Three years ago she warned that “dog whistles win votes but destroy nations”. Last week, Warsi was even more robust in her criticism of former colleagues. As was the former counter-extremism tsar Dame Sara Khan. They and others have denounced the ways in which the last government poisoned political debate and normalised Islamophobia, while at the same time dismissing warnings of the growing dangers of far-right extremism.

They are not looking to address inequalities but to target those whom they will never accept as fellow Britons

While the rioters and those willing to assign coherent political meanings to their criminality have spoken loudly, others have fallen deathly silent. As figures like Warsi took to the TV and podcast studios the politicians who are normally most vocal when there are divisions to be fomented and culture wars to be fought went awol. Kemi Badenoch’s retreat from the airwaves was so complete that even other Tories dubbed her disappearing act a “submarine” strategy.

The profound injustices and stark regional disparities that have been wrongly ascribed as the motivations of the rioters urgently and obviously need to be addressed. But that reality has nothing directly to do with the

actions of people who burned down a library and an advice centre, looted booze from a smashed-up Sainsbury’s and hurled rocks at Filipino nurses on their way to their shifts in NHS hospitals.

Far-right groups, organising online, increasingly inspired by and connected to similar groups in the US and Europe, are not motivated by such concerns. They are, however, always eager to exploit them. The far-right already have an agenda; they always have. Disconnected from reason, it changes little over time. Behind the curtain of the dark web, in their grim chatrooms and Telegram forums, their true motivations are on display. They are not looking to address inequalities but to target those whom they will never accept as fellow Britons.

In doing so, they, and those swept up in the chaos they foment, are willing to tear apart the nation to which they preposterously claim to be patriots.

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