Guest Essay

The New York Times

Laws Need to Catch Up to Artificial Intelligence’s Unique Risks

Sept. 29, 2024

By Garrison Lovely (Mr. Lovely is a freelance journalist.)

For about five years, OpenAI used a system of nondisclosure agreements to stifle public criticism from outgoing employees. Current and former OpenAI staff members were paranoid about talking to the press. In May, one departing employee refused to sign and went public in The Times. The company apologized and scrapped the agreements. Then the floodgates opened. Exiting employees began criticizing OpenAI’s safety practices, and a wave of articles emerged about its broken promises.

These stories came from people who were willing to risk their careers to inform the public. How many more are silenced because they’re too scared to speak out? Since existing whistle-blower protections typically cover only the reporting of illegal conduct, they are inadequate here. Artificial intelligence can be dangerous without being illegal. A.I. needs stronger protections — like those in place in parts of the public sector, finance and publicly traded companies — that prohibit retaliation and establish anonymous reporting channels.

Since more comprehensive national A.I. regulations aren’t coming anytime soon, we need a narrow federal law allowing employees to disclose information to Congress if they reasonably believe that an A.I. model poses a significant safety risk. Congress should establish a special inspector general to serve as a point of contact for these whistle-blowers. The law should mandate companies to notify staff about the channels available to them, which they can use without facing retaliation.

Such protections are essential for an industry that works so closely with such exceptionally risky technology, particularly when regulators have not caught up with the risks. People reporting violations of the Atomic Energy Act have more robust whistle-blower protections than those in most fields, while those working in biological toxins for several government departments are protected by proactive, pro-reporting guidance. A.I. workers need similar rules.

This month, OpenAI released a highly advanced new model. For the first time, experts concluded the model could aid in the construction of a bioweapon more effectively than internet research alone could. A third party hired by the company found that the new system demonstrated evidence of “power seeking” and “the basic capabilities needed to do simple in-context scheming.” OpenAI decided to publish these results, but the company still chooses what information to share. It is possible the published information paints an incomplete picture of the model’s risks.

The A.I. safety researcher Todor Markov, who recently left OpenAI after nearly six years with the firm, suggested one hypothetical scenario. An A.I. company promises to test its model for dangerous capabilities, then cherry-picks results to make the model look safe. A concerned employee wants to notify someone but doesn’t know who and can’t point to a specific law being broken. The new model is released, and a terrorist uses it to construct a novel bioweapon. Multiple former OpenAI employees told me this scenario is plausible.

The United States’ current arrangement of managing A.I. risks through voluntary commitments places enormous trust in the companies developing this potentially dangerous technology. Unfortunately, the industry in general — and OpenAI in particular — has shown itself to be unworthy of that trust, time and again.

Last month a group of leading A.I. experts warned that as the technology rapidly progresses, “we face growing risks that A.I. could be misused to attack critical infrastructure, develop dangerous weapons or cause other forms of catastrophic harm.” These risks aren’t necessarily criminal, but they are real — and they could prove deadly. If that happens, employees at OpenAI and other companies will be the first to know. But will they tell us?